


A female worker in a white protective suit, orange hard hat, and yellow safety vest is operating a large industrial vessel. She is holding a yellow control device and a long metal rod. The vessel is a large, cylindrical stainless steel tank with a central vertical shaft and a white handle on top. The background shows a dark industrial setting with metal railings and other equipment.

35 YEARS OF SUCCESSFUL OPERATION – LOVIISA NPP

Overview of Fortum's nuclear fleet



Loviisa

Two units
 $2 \times 498 \text{ MW} = 996 \text{ MW}$



Olkiluoto

Two units, one under construction
 $880 + 860 \text{ MW} = 1740 \text{ MW}$
Under construction 1600 MW
Fortum's share: 27 % (463 MW)



Oskarshamn


Three units
 $473 + 638 + 1400 = 2511 \text{ MW}$
Fortum's share: 43 % (1089 MW)



Forsmark

Three units
 $978 + 990 + 1170 = 3138 \text{ MW}$
Fortum's share: 22 % (696 MW)

Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2



Fortum Power Division – Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant

Loviisa NPP includes two PWR units
VVER-440, 2 x 496 MWe (net)


Loviisa 1 started operation in 1977
and Loviisa 2 in 1980

Strategic plant lifetime target 50 years

- Gross load factors 2011: LO1 94,7 %
 LO2 94,8 %


Annual production 8,06 TWh (net)

Own personnel 504 and 80 permanent contractors




Production – Annually 1977 - 2011

LO1+LO2 Electricity production (TWh, net) and capacity factor (% , gross)
1977-2011




Production - Efficiency


Loviisa 1 and 2 gross efficiency 1977 - 2011



Selected actions to support the current operating license and optimized decommissioning



Safety, EHS & HR- Operational Incidents



2010


- 2 INES > 0
- 0 INES = 0
- 1 Special reports (ER)
- 3 Operational disturbance report (HK)

2011 (7.11.2011)

- 0 INES > 0
- 2 INES = 0
- 2 Special reports (ER)
- 5 Operational disturbance report (HK)

Most important safety systems at Loviisa NPP

1. Steel containment
2. Containment's external spray system
3. Air filters
4. Reserve emergency feed water pumping station
5. Reactor pressure vessel
6. Low-pressure safety injection pumps
7. High-pressure safety injection pumps
8. Emergency feed water pumps
9. Electric connection from hydro power plant + gas turbine
10. Emergency power diesel generators
11. Containment spray
12. Hydrogen recombiners and igniters
13. Ice condensers
14. Hydro accumulators



Severe Accident Management (SAM)


If all cooling systems and power supply are lost, the fuel starts to melt in the reactor core. The **reactor pressure vessel can be cooled from outside** with water melting from ice condensers, thus retaining molten core inside the vessel.

Heat is removed from the containment by **outside spray cooling** (autonomous system).

With these arrangements the reactor pressure vessel and containment are kept intact.


Dedicated, radiation protected **SAM control room** has been constructed.

To **prevent hydrogen explosions**, the containment is equipped with passive recombiners and igniters.




Improvement in plant safety

Loviisa 1 Risk distribution



Loviisa 1 Risk distribution after year 2011 outage Core damage frequency 4,3E-5/a PSA11M3



The results of the stress tests and future actions

- Design Criteria's are right
- Finnish requirements and guidelines are more stringent than in other countries or in relevant IAEA standards
- Continuous improvement of safety has been done in a systematic way on the Finnish plants
- Planned actions are right
- No need for immediate actions
- STUK has required plans for planned actions, and will present specific requirements to the Finnish plants during summer 2012
- Safety improvements can be made in the frame of annual investment programs, and do not affect availability

Safety improvements to be further evaluated in Loviisa based on “stress tests”

- Containment heat removal without sea water systems
- Study of need to increase fuel for emergency power at site
- Decay heat removal from SFP to UHS in extreme events
- Alternative means of decay heat removal from in-containment fuel pools
- Measures to increase margins in case of flooding will be evaluated
- Battery capacity
- Multi units severe accidents; emergency preparedness